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INTRODUCTION
Capitalization is an indispensable step in the creation of
any business enterprise. Start-up ventures are especially
challenging to finance, where investors balance the high
potential yield on their capital contributions against the
overwhelming probability those investments will never mature
into the Powerball-esque 1 windfalls from Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs). 2 The cunning venture capitalist (which most
are), bears in mind the risk of bankruptcy in order to protect
at least some piece of their investment should the enterprise
fail (which most do). 3 The present bankruptcy system,
however, contains a multitude of unpredictable risks making
this task exceedingly difficult. Among these risks is the power
of federal bankruptcy courts to equitably subordinate loans,
transforming the creditor interest in those loans from debt to
equity. Under the absolute priority rule, an equity interest has
only a residual priority to the assets of a corporation, whereas
debt interest has first priority. 4
Equitable subordination was long considered the
bankruptcy court’s exclusive tool to alter the nature of debt
(and thus priority of a creditor to collect in bankruptcy under
the absolute priority rule). However, another means for courts
to transmute debt has quietly arisen. Bankruptcy courts have

1. Powerball is a popular multi-state shared jackpot lottery in the United
States. At the time of this writing, odds of winning the grand prize stand at 1 :
175,223,510. See POWERBALL POWERPLAY, http://www.powerball.com/powerbal
l/pb_howtoplay.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
2. Only one percent of startups will reach an independent IPO. While
seventy percent will fail. See Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out
of 4 Start-Ups Fail, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476
429190.
3. See Gage, supra note 2.
4. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B); see also In re DBSD North America, Inc.,
634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011) (where a bankruptcy judge invalidated a
reorganization plan under which debtor’s shareholders received a portion of their
claims without prior consent of unsecured creditors who had priority to those
assets); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991).
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“recharacterized” debt, reclassifying loans as equity in
bankruptcy regardless of any inequitable conduct on behalf of
that creditor to whom the sum is owed. This power of debt
recharacterization is not without debate. Several courts have
found this power as impliedly reserved to federal law, while
others see recharacterization as dependent solely on state law.
A third contingent finds no basis whatsoever for debt to be
recharacterized. These distinct views are troubling because
they sow unpredictability into business decisions where
stability is precious. The inability to foresee, at least to some
degree, the disposition of debt financing efforts may chill the
investment environment as investors hesitate to provide
bridge loans or other forms of enterprise-saving debt financing.
This Comment will begin by providing background of both
debt recharacterization and equitable subordination. Key
features of bankruptcy in the United States will be examined,
including 1) the equitable and statutory bases through which
bankruptcy courts operate, 5 2) the congressionally mandated
uniformity for which these courts strive, 6 and 3) the role of
Following this
state law in bankruptcy proceedings. 7
background, an explanation of key doctrinal issues associated
with the current state of debt recharacterization will be
explained, 8 including an analysis of the practical challenges
the legal community currently faces. 9 Lastly, this comment
will propose that debt recharacterization be codified within the
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) as an express grant of power to
bankruptcy courts so as to remain viable for use in bankruptcy
proceedings. 10 Codification within the Code will provide a
uniform nationwide standard and serve as a stable foundation
upon which corporate attorneys can structure financings. The
result is a more coherent body of insolvency law that helps, not
hinders, the market for business investment.

I.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

THE SOURCES OF BANKRUPTCY COURT POWER AND
DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION AND
See infra Part I(A)(1), I(A)(2).
See infra Part I(A)(4).
See infra Part I(A)(5).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III(E).
See infra Part IV.
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DEBT RECHARACTERIZATION
The debt recharacterization issue is best conceptualized
through an understanding of two central themes. First, the
nature and function of the bankruptcy court system itself is
vital to the analysis. The equitable and statutory functions
that bind bankruptcy courts, as well as the role of state law in
bankruptcy proceedings, frame an analysis of whether the
current debt recharacterization doctrine furthers the base
purpose of the United States bankruptcy system.
Second, in addition to an understanding of the bankruptcy
regime, it is important to understand the key differences
between equitable subordination and debt recharacterization.
This distinction is of obvious importance in considering
whether the two doctrines serve as legitimate solutions to
independent problems, or impose clumsy superfluities on an
already overwhelmed judiciary.
A. Sources of Bankruptcy Court Power
The United States Bankruptcy Code serves as the
foundation upon which bankruptcy courts exercise their power.
However, bankruptcy courts have long been considered to
wield additional legal authority beyond that expressly written
into the Code. These additional exercises of power above and
beyond that granted by the Code can be classified as stemming
from an inherent power of the courts, from federal common
law, or as equitable power.
1. Inherent Powers
The inherent powers of the federal district courts arise
from Article III of the United States Constitution. 11 However,
because bankruptcy court are established pursuant to Article
I, they maintain no such constitutional authority. 12 Though
some courts have interpreted Bankruptcy Code section 105(a)

11. See U.S. CONST. art. III (“The judicial power of the United States, shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”).
12. See In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1156 (7th Cir. 1992) (bankruptcy
courts “derive their authority solely from Congress, while district courts are
accorded their inherent powers in Article III”); In re Hessinger & Assocs., 192
B.R. 211, 215 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Because the bankruptcy courts are creatures of
Article I, they have no ‘inherent’ powers and their jurisdiction is limited to that
expressly granted by Congress.”).
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as granting inherent power to bankruptcy judges, 13 debate
remains over whether this constitutes a true inherent power or
simply the exercise of broadly construed statutory authority. 14
Notwithstanding Section 105(a), courts have consistently
held that bankruptcy courts have inherent powers in a variety
of other situations. Bankruptcy judges have the power to
sanction parties, 15 enforce settlements, 16 issue injunctions, 17
direct disbursements of registry funds, 18 set aside illegal
assignments, 19 reconsider interlocutory orders, 20 punish
abuses of process, 21 correct mistakes and errors, 22 dismiss
cases, 23 hold parties in contempt, 24 suspend or disbar

13. In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 657 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Caldwell v. Unified
Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 284 (9th Cir.
1996) (observing that inherent power to sanction vexatious conduct is recognized
in section 105(a)); Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd.), 40 F.3d
1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that section 105 is intended to imbue the
bankruptcy courts with the inherent power recognized by the Supreme Court in
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.); In re Marvel, 265 B.R. at 609 (noting that a
bankruptcy court’s inherent power to sanction conduct recognized by section
105(a)).
14. See, e.g., Nw. Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)
(“[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can
only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”); but see In re GSF
Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1474 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting a broad grant of equitable
power under § 105(a)); See generally 2-105 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01[2], p.
105–06 (16th ed. 2010).
15. See Pearson v. First NH Mortgage Corp., 200 F.3d 30, 42 (1st Cir.
1999); McGahren v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 111 F.3d 1159, 1172 (4th
Cir. 1997).
16. See City Equities Anaheim, Ltd. v. Lincoln Plaza Dev. Co. (In re City
Equities Anaheim, Ltd.), 22 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1994).
17. See S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv., Inc. (In re S.I.
Acquisition, Inc.), 817 F.2d 1142, 1146 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987) DOC 19; A.H. Robins
Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1003 (4th Cir. 1986).
18. See United States v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In re Trans World
Airlines, Inc.), 18 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 1994).
19. See Dalton Dev. Project v. Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Unioil), 948
F.2d 678, 682 (10th Cir. 1991).
20. See Roumeliotis v. Popa (In re Popa), 214 B.R. 416, 420 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
1997).
21. See McCrary v. Barrack (In re Barrack), 217 B.R. 598, 608 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1998).
22. See Canino v. Bleau (In re Canino), 185 B.R. 584, 592 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1995).
23. See Marino v. Classic Auto Refinishing, Inc. (In re Marino), 213 B.R. 846,
851 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997); Tenorio v. Osinga (In re Osinga), 91 B.R. 893, 894
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988).
24. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Lapin (In re Lapin), 226 B.R. 637, 642 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1998).
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attorneys, 25 review actions of state courts and enjoin further
proceedings, 26 and control the court’s dockets. 27
2. Federal Common Law
Federal common law is another avenue through which
federal courts have been able to exert judicial power outside
the scope of statutory schemes. Since bankruptcy judges are
considered judicial officers of their respective district courts,28
it would seem appropriate that bankruptcy courts share the
ability of U.S. District Courts to contribute to federal common
law where such a tradition has been established. Generally,
federal common law is appropriate where it is either 1)
necessary to protect uniquely federal interests, or 2) where
Congress has specifically given the courts the power to develop
substantive law. 29 The general precondition for the formation
of federal common law is a showing that there is “significant
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law.” 30 The instances where the United States Supreme
Court has deemed a federal common law appropriate are “few
and restricted.” 31 Specifically, the Court has noted that:
Absent some congressional authorization to formulate
substantive rules of decision, federal common law only
exists in such narrow areas as those concerned with the
rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of
States or our relation with foreign nations or admiralty
cases. 32

Thus far, there is a finite list of federal common law
application in bankruptcy cases. This exhaustive list includes
the governance of privileges, 33 the requirement that
25. See Peugeot v. United States Trustee (In re Crayton), 192 B.R. 970, 976
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996).
26. See Watson v. Shandell (In re Watson), 192 B.R. 739, 746 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1996); Fernandez-Lopez v. Fernandez-Lopez (In re Fernandez-Lopez), 37 B.R.
664, 669 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984).
27. See In re Moog, 774 F. 2d 1073, 1076 (11th Cir. 1995).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 151, 152(a)(1) (2000).
29. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
30. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v.
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
31. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
32. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
33. See Foster v. Hill (In re Foster), 188 F.3d 1259, 1264–65 (10th Cir.
1999) (“Federal common law governs control of a debtor’s privilege.”); Am.
Metrocomm Corp. v. Morris (In re Am. Metrocomm Corp.), 274 B.R. 641, 653
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permission be obtained before suing a trustee in bankruptcy, 34
whether a constructive trust arises under Bankruptcy Code
Section 541(d), 35 and choice of law. 36 Federal common law has
also been applied in bankruptcy cases regarding federal
government “setoff rights” 37 to pension plans under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 38 and in
recognizing liens under ERISA. 39
The Supreme Court has expressly refused to allow the
formulation of federal common law “to supplement a federal
statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed,” 40
stating that “matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are
presumably left subject to disposition provided by state law.” 41
The Bankruptcy Code is precisely this sort of comprehensive
federal statutory system, 42 and therefore matters left
unaddressed in the Code seem subject to state law rather than
substantive judicial lawmaking. 43
3. Equitable Power
While bankruptcy courts are virtually unanimously
considered courts of equity, 44 this concept is somewhat of a
misnomer. 45 All courts derive their equitable powers “from . . .
(Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (“Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that, except where
state law provides the governing rule in civil proceedings, control of a debtor’s
privileges is governed by federal common law.”).
34. See Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2000).
35. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Columbia Gas Sys. Inc. (In
re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc.), 997 F.2d 1039, 1055–62 (3d Cir. 1993).
36. See Bianco v. Erkins (In re Gaston & Snow), 243 F.3d 599, 601 (2d Cir.
2001) (“[F]ederal choice of law rules are a type of federal common law”).
37. United States v. Fleet Bank of Mass. (In re Calore Express Co.), 288 F.3d
22, 43 (1st Cir. 2002).
38. Senior Executive Benefit Plan v. New Valley Corp. (In re New Valley
Corp.), 89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996).
39. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 252 B.R. 905, 910
(E.D. Va. 2000).
40. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994).
41. Id.
42. See Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 B.R. 162, 168 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
43. Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 633, 639 (2004) (“[F]ederal courts may not create federal common law and
must find and follow state law when confronted with a legal issue that is beyond
the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause [of the Constitution.]”).
44. See e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002); United States v.
Energy Res. Co., Inc., 495 U.S. 545, 549–50 (1990); Nw. Bank Worthington, v.
Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 214
(1945); Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942).
45. Courts of equity developed in England as an alternative to the common

776

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:55

the provisions of statutes or constitutions.” 46 Therefore, it
follows that federal courts enjoy equitable powers to the extent
that such ability is conferred by the Constitution. 47 As
mentioned previously, bankruptcy courts were created under
Article I, not Article III, and thus are not vested with the same
equitable authority the federal district courts enjoy. 48
Consequently, the equitable powers of bankruptcy courts are
derived from the Code. 49
Under the present iteration of the Code, a court does not
have any general equitable authority. Nonetheless, some
courts have construed Bankruptcy Code section 105(a) to grant
equitable power. 50 That section authorizes a bankruptcy judge
to “issue any order, process, or judgment necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Code.51
Additionally, Congress has incorporated specific equitable
principles into the Code itself. For example, a bankruptcy
judge may issue an automatic injunction—an equitable
law courts. Administered by a Chancellor as opposed to a common law judge,
these courts issued bills in equity intended to alleviate injustices that would
result from the rigid application of common law. See, e.g., Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914–21 (1987).
46. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 530,
554 (4th ed. 1918); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 64 (2d ed. 1839) (“The Constitution of the United States has, in
one clause, conferred on the National Judiciary cognizance of cases in equity”).
47. See also McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201, 206 (1887) (“[Equity
jurisdiction] is vested, as a part of the judicial power of the United States, in its
courts by the constitution and the acts of congress in execution thereof.”); Noonan
v. Lee, 67 U.S. 499, 509 (1862) (“The equity jurisdiction of the Courts of the
United States is derived from the Constitution and Laws of the United States.”).
48. See Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court’s
Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 378
(2001) (“Article I courts have no general equitable powers or generalized ability
to grant equitable relief purely from their existence as courts of law. However, to
the extent that Congress affords to an Article I court jurisdiction over equitable
causes of action or jurisdiction to grant equitable relief, the court has those
powers unless the grant unconstitutionally infringes on Article III courts.”).
49. See Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”: What
Does that Mean?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 275, 292 (1999) (“Bankruptcy remedies
and insolvency rights have always been a product of legislative enactment rather
than case-by-case determination in common law or equity courts.”); Lederman,
supra note 48, at 376 (“In general, any equitable power an Article I court exercises
finds its source in a statute.”).
50. See Brenham v. Deerfield Org., Inc. (In re Norman Indus., Inc.), 1 B.R.
162, 165 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1979) (stating that the predecessor of § 105(a)
recognized and declared the principle that courts of bankruptcy are courts of
equity).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).
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remedy. 52 Perhaps most pertinent to the present issue, Section
510 permits a bankruptcy court to equitably subordinate
creditor claims. 53
Therefore, bankruptcy courts do not enjoy unbounded
powers of equity; specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
explicitly indicate when a court should evaluate the equitable
side of a legal issue.
4. The Uniformity Requirement
The Constitution empowers Congress to make “uniform
Laws . . . on the subject of Bankruptcies.” 54 This concept is
problematic in bankruptcies because state laws govern
relationships between debtors and creditors. This means that
a creditor in one state may likely face a different result than
they would in another. At a glance, this discrepancy would
seem to compromise the uniformity demanded by the
Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution. The Court, however,
has ruled to the contrary. 55 In the landmark decision of
Hanover Int’l Bank v. Moyses, 56 the Court held that that the
Constitution only required “geographic uniformity.” 57 The
Court upheld the incorporation of state transaction laws into
the Bankruptcy Code, and observed that geographic
uniformity was satisfied when “the trustee takes in each state
whatever would have been available to the creditor if the
bankrupt law had not been passed.” 58
A bankruptcy law is uniform then, when i) the state
substantive law applied in bankruptcy would also apply
outside of bankruptcy, ii) creditors and debtors are all subject
to the same law, and iii) Congress has delegated the power to
states to fix such laws. 59 Thus, creditors in differing states may
receive disparate treatment without rendering a state law
unconstitutional for violating the uniformity clause. Most

52. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
53. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 510.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
55. See Judith S. Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22
(1983).
56. Hanover Nat’l Bank of the City of New York v. Max Moyses, 186 U.S. 181
(1902).
57. Id. at 188.
58. Id. at 190.
59. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 47 (1995).
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recently, lower courts have upheld Moyses when state specific
exemption provisions were challenged. 60 While the Supreme
Court has not considered these specific exemption provisions,
it has continued to reaffirm that “the uniformity requirement
is not a straightjacket that forbids Congress to distinguish
among classes of debtors, nor does it prohibit Congress from
recognizing that state laws do not treat commercial
transactions in a uniform manner.” 61 Thus, the possibility
remains that Congress may add specific provisions to the
Bankruptcy Code to ensure uniformity nationwide.
Literal uniformity may not be available under modern
bankruptcy jurisprudence since state laws may differ with
respect to their treatment of the creditor-debtor relationship.62
Nonetheless, the underlying intent behind the Uniformity
Clause to provide as equal results as possible between
bankruptcy courts across the nation should still be recognized
as an underlying aspiration for bankruptcy proceedings.
5. State Law in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Despite the constitutionally mandated uniformity
bankruptcy courts strive to create among the nationwide class
of creditors, several elements of bankruptcy proceedings
remain firmly rooted in the law of individual states.
Identifying these bastions of state law in federal bankruptcy
proceedings is relevant to a debt recharacterization discussion
because a number of courts have found debt recharacterization
to be a claim rooted in state law. Further, some have advocated
for debt recharachterization as state law remedy separate from
federal bankruptcy law. 63 Whether these approaches are
viable depends on state law application to bankruptcy, and
whether debt recharacterization fits within these areas.
Property rights are the primary area through which state
law enters bankruptcy proceedings. Even in the days of Swift
v. Tyson, 64 where the Court recognized a general federal
common law, state law was relied on to define property

60. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.).
61. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982).
62. See generally Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform
Laws”, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2012).
63. See, e.g., James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt
Recharacterization under State Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257 (2007).
64. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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rights. 65 The Supreme Court has consistently held that federal
statutes “create no property rights but merely attach
consequences . . . to rights created under state law.” 66 Most
commonly, state laws regarding business transactions (such as
state variations of the Uniform Commercial Code) govern the
nature of state transactions and the rights that result from
these transactions when they are evaluated later under the
Bankruptcy Code. 67
State law causes of action are another area where
bankruptcy law may be supplemented by state law. For
example, the Delaware Supreme Court recently precluded a
cause of action against the directors of a company after that
The
company was declared insolvent in bankruptcy. 68
Delaware corporate shield statute was applied, resulting in the
dismissal of the bankruptcy trustee’s action against the
directors under the Delaware statute. 69
B. Debt Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination
1. Equitable Subordination
The principles that drive equitable subordination stem
from a policy to deter fraud and breach of fiduciary duties by
controlling shareholders of bankrupt entities. 70 Two Supreme
Court cases established the primary guidelines bankruptcy
courts follow when equitably subordinating creditor claims
that were later codified into the Bankruptcy Code itself. In
Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co., 71 the Court
considered the claim of a parent corporation whose subsidiary
65. See generally Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas
Storage Easement, 962 F.2d 1192, 1198 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[P]roperty rights have
traditionally been, and to a large degree are still, defined in substantial part by
state law.”); United States v. MidPac Lumber Co., Ltd., 976 F. Supp. 1310, 1315
(D. Haw. 1997) (“In determining whether such property or rights to property
exists, federal and state courts must look to state law.” (citing Aquilino v. United
States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960))).
66. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (“Congress has
generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s
estate to state law.”).
67. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); Vanston
Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
68. See Prod. Res v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 787–95 (Del. Ch. 2004).
69. Id.
70. Jeremy W. Dickens, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of
Lender Liability: Toward A New Model of “Control,” 65 TEX. L. REV. 801, 805
(1987).
71. Taylor et al. v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co. et al., 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
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was in bankruptcy. The stock of the debtor company, Deep
Rock Oil Corp., was owned almost entirely by Standard Gas
and Electric. 72 Standard was also Deep Rock Oil’s creditor. 73
In the proceedings, preferred shareholders of Deep Rock Oil
challenged Standard’s claim, seeking subordination of that
claim in relation to those of the preferred shareholders. 74 The
Court found that not only was Deep Rock undercapitalized, but
that through mismanagement, Standard improperly caused
Deep Rock to enter into a series of transactions that benefitted
Standard and harmed Deep Rock. 75 Additionally, Standard
caused Deep Rock to continually pay improper dividends to the
preferred stockholders, which prevented their ability to take a
management role in the company. 76 The Court refused to
subordinate Standard Gas and Electric’s claim simply because
it exercised control over Deep Rock. 77 However, the Court did
order that in whatever form Deep Rock was reorganized into
following the bankruptcy, the preferred stockholders were to
have an equity interest superior to Standard’s. 78
The following term, the Court considered Pepper v.
Litton. 79 The importance of Pepper lies in the Court’s holding
that subordination of a corporate director’s claim (in this case,
for salary deficiencies) is appropriate where that director
breaches his fiduciary duty. 80 The Court reasoned that
directors’ dealings with a corporation are subject to rigorous
scrutiny. 81 Thus, when agreements made between directors
and the corporations are challenged, the burden lies with the
director to show good faith and fairness of the transaction. 82
Pepper lays the foundational principles for equitable
subordination. Viewing Taylor and Pepper together, courts
need not find fraudulent activity to subordinate claims. 83
Control by a shareholder and undercapitalization of the
corporation are likewise not essential prerequisites (though

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 310.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 320.
Taylor et al. v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co. et al., 306 U.S. 323 (1939).
See id.
Id. at 324.
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
Id. at 311–12.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 312.
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they constitute grounds in themselves for equitable
subordination). 84 It is sufficient that a fiduciary breach the
duty of loyalty by acting for its own benefit and to the
detriment of the corporation in bankruptcy. 85 If such an
occurrence is present, a court may invoke its power to
subordinate the claims of the party at fault “to the end that
fraud will not prevail.” 86
The above cases provided the foundational principles upon
which Section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code was eventually
based. Section 510(c)(1) provides bankruptcy courts with the
express authority to subordinate claims in relation to those of
others. 87 The provisions’ legislative histories clearly indicate
that Congress “intended the term ‘principles of equitable
subordination’ follow existing case law and leave to the court
By specifically
the development of this principle.” 88
incorporating equitable subordination into the Code, Congress
rejected any per se subordination of insider debt. 89
2. Debt Recharacterization
Similar
to
equitable
subordination,
debt
recharacterization supplies a means by which bankruptcy
courts will consider debt as equity for purposes of creditor
priority during bankruptcy. 90 As with equitable subordination,
when a creditor has debt recharacterized from debt to equity,
they fall behind other creditors who would then have superior
claims of control over the assets of a corporation during
liquidation or reorganization based on the absolute priority
rule. 91 The factors through which a court will decide to
recharacterize debt remain in flux. Currently, no less than
three separate lines of federal case law address debt
84. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308–10 (1939).
85. Id. at 310–11.
86. Id. at 305.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000).
88. 124 Cong. Rec. 32398 (1978).
89. Congress rejected the idea of blanket subordination of all insider claims;
in the report accompanying the final bill, Congress endorsed existing case law
and affirmed the equitable power of the bankruptcy courts to subordinate claims
in circumstances consistent with current case law. H.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 359
(1978).
90. See generally Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Debt-to-Equity
Recharacterization Is It More Than Equitable Subordination’s Evil Twin?, 22NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (2004).
91. See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991).
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recharacterization, in addition to state doctrines on the issue.
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted an objective test with
respect to debt recharacterization. This two-pronged test was
first established in Estes v. N & D. Properties, Inc. 92 The court
stated that “shareholder loans may be deemed capital
contributions in two circumstances: where the trustee proves
initial undercapitalization or where the trustee proves that the
loans were made when no other disinterested lender would
have extended credit.” 93 This test is articulated for the first
time in Estes, as no prior precedent is cited. 94
The court also asserts that a stockholder and lender share
fiduciary obligations to one another without reference to state
law (which, as stated above, would normally govern such a
relationship). 95 Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Estes
that a shareholder loan to a corporation should be deemed per
se invalid if a disinterested third party would not have
extended such a loan. 96 The Eleventh Circuit approach has not
enjoyed acceptance in any of the other courts.
In sharp contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the
Third, Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have advanced multifactored tests for debt recharacterization more flexible than
that posed by the Eleventh Circuit. 97 While each test differs
semantically, the substantive basis behind each remains the
same. 98 The most commonly cited of such tests is from Roth
Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 99 where
eleven factors were considered. 100 The court stated that not all
92. Estes v. N & D Props., Inc., 799 F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 733.
94. See generally id.
95. Id. at 731–32.
96. Id. at 733.
97. See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432
F.3d 448, 455 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006); Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors, 453 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 2006); Bayer Corp. v.
MascoTech, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 747–53 (6th Cir. 2001); Sender v. The Bronze
Group, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004).
98. In re Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Dornier Aviation (North
America) Inc. v. The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (The Plan Monitoring
Comm.), 453 F.3d 225, 234 n.6 (“The substance of all of these multifactor tests is
identical.”).
99. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 800 F.2d 625 (6th
Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 630. Factors considered were “(1) the names given to the
instruments, if any, evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a
fixed maturity date and schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of a
fixed rate of interest and interest payments; (4) the source of repayments; (5) the
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factors needed to be applied to every case, 101 that the weight
given to each factor may vary, and that no single factor was
controlling. 102 Specifically, status as an insider creditor and
undercapitalization by themselves do not warrant debt
recharacterization. 103 To distinguish debt recharacterization
from equitable subordination, courts following this approach
have reasoned that debt recharacterization is a method of
determining intent rather than assigning fault. 104 Creditor
conduct is still relevant though, when it is pertinent to
determining intent of the transaction at issue. 105
Debt tends to remain enforceable when the Roth Steel
factors are applied as long as an inside creditor dealt with the
bankrupt entity in the same manner as an outsider. 106 At the
same time, insiders are also generally considered fiduciaries,
so transactions that harm other creditors encounter increased
scrutiny. 107 The factor that most commonly results in debt
being recharacterized is where the loan is unconventional or
poorly documented. 108 Since no single factor is determinative
however, even the most poorly documented loans do not
warrant automatic recharacterization. 109 In a practical sense,
the Roth Steel factors are rarely used to recharacterize debt as
equity, out of concerns that such judicial activism would
“discourage legitimate efforts to keep a flagging business
afloat.” 110 Insider loans are the sole type of situation where
courts have been willing to even consider recharacterization,
and even in a large number of such decisions,
adequacy or inadequacy of capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between the
creditor and the stockholder; (7) the security, if any, for the advances; (8) the
corporation’s ability to obtain financing from outside lending institutions; (9) the
extent to which the advances were subordinated to the claims of outside creditors;
(10) the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets; and
(11) the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide repayments.”
101. See In re SubMicron Sys. v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP, 432 F.3d 448, 455
n.8 (3d Cir. 2006).
102. See id. at 456; Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234.
103. See Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234.
104. See SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 456; Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 232.
105. See SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 456.
106. See id.
107. See Cent. Coops., Inc. v. Irwin (In re Colonial Poultry Farms), 177 B.R.
291, 300 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995).
108. See Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 236.
109. See SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 458; In re Internet Navigator, Inc., 289
B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003).
110. In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 n.1.(10th Cir. 2004). DOC
88
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recharacterization was ultimately rejected. 111
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast to both the Eleventh Circuit
approach and the multi-factor analysis shared by the four
circuits above, has traditionally held that bankruptcy courts
completely lack authority to recharacterize loans. 112 The Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held in Creditors’ Comms.
of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp., Inc.
that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow recharacterization of
debt as capital contributions. 113 The court noted that since
Bankruptcy Code section 510(c) already governed equitable
claim subordination, the ability of courts to recharacterize debt
Despite the
by different means was impermissible. 114
reasoning of Pacific Express, the Ninth Circuit, in a recent
decision appears to have adopted the reasoning of the fourcircuit coalition and its multi-factor test. 115 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit serves as a perfect demonstration of the present
uncertainty of debt recharacterization as applied by the courts.
In addition to the rules promulgated by the Eleventh,
Ninth, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, state law has
also been utilized as a basis for debt recharacterization
Decisions in
completely independent of federal law. 116
Massachusetts and Wisconsin serve as an illustration.
Massachusetts courts have identified two primary factors
applied when considering whether to recharacterize debt.
Initial undercapitalization of a business organization serves as
the first basis. 117 In Albert Richards, Co. v. The Mayfair Inc.,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recharacterized
debt as equity based on that corporation’s nominal
111. See e.g., SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 458; Viera v. AGM II, LLC (In
re Worldwide Wholesale Lumber, Inc.), 372 B.R 796, 811–12 (Bankr. D. S.C. May
21, 2007); Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555, 561–62
(D. R.I. 1993); Congress Fin Corp. v. Airwalk Int’l, LLC (In re Airwalk Int’l, LLC),
305 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003).
112. See Unsecured Creditors’ Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer
Commercial Funding Corp., Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).
113. Id. at 115.
114. Id.
115. See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013).
116. See, e.g., Obre v. Alban Tractor Co., 179 A.2d 861 (Md. 1962); Albert
Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934); Yankee Microwave, Inc.
v. Petricca Commc’n Sys., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 739, 759 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Schaub
v. Kortgard, 372 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Anderson Excavating &
Wrecking Co. v. Argus Dev. Co., 2002 WL 31747248, at *12 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec.
10, 2002); Lascsak v. Hollingsworth, 2006 WL 786455, at *6–7 (Neb. Ct. App.
Mar. 28, 2006); Waller v. Am. Int’l Distrib. Corp., 706 A.2d 460, 464 (Vt. 1997).
117. See Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934).
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capitalization. 118 This decision was later cited by the Supreme
Court in Pepper v. Litton 119 (which was the case establishing
equitable subordination, not recharacterization). 120 The Albert
Richards decision also seemed to perform what would later
become an equitable subordination analysis. 121 The court
expressly stated that under Massachusetts’s law, “the right
and the duty of courts to look beyond the corporate forms are
exercised only for the defeat of fraud or wrong, or the remedy
of injustice.” 122
The second factor considered by Massachusetts state
courts, inequitable conduct, further blurs the line between debt
recharacterization under state
law
and
equitable
subordination under the Code. In SFB Corp v. Cambridge
Automatic, Inc., 123 the Massachusetts Superior Court
considered enforcement of a promissory note owned by the
President and CEO of a company. 124 The court refused to apply
the Roth Steel factors 125 when considering the request to
recharacterize the loan. 126 Instead, Massachusetts’s law was
applied, where the loan survived recharacterization. 127
Wisconsin is the second state to have formulated an
independent state basis for debt recharacterization. In the
leading decision on the issue, In re Mader’s Store for Men,
Inc., 128 the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly rejected
federal bankruptcy court precedent. 129 The court identified
three factors that almost always result in a debt being
recharacterized as a capital contribution. 130 Firstly, loans
made to the corporation by individuals who can exert some
degree of substantial control over the company form a basis for
that debt to be recharacterized. 131 Secondly, under an objective
viewpoint, the circumstances must indicate that the loan was

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 434–35.
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 309–10 (1939).
See supra Part I(B)(1).
See Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934).
Hanson v. Bradley, 10 N.E.2d 259, 264 (1937).
2002 WL 31481078 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2002).
See id.
See infra note 93.
See SFB Corp., 2002 WL 31481078.
Id. at 1.
Gelatt v. DeDakis, 254 N.W.2d 171 (Wis. 1977).
See id.
Id. at 186.
Id.
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never intended to be repaid in full. 132 Third, the amount of
initial capitalization must be nominal or unreasonably small
in view of the nature and size of the corporation for
recharacterization to occur. 133 Using these three factors, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the corporation was
sufficiently capitalized from its birth. 134 Accordingly, the debt
was not recharacterized. 135
II.
THE CURRENT APPROACH TO DEBT
RECHARACTERIZATION IS UNWORKABLE IN BOTH
THEORY AND APPLICATION
The varying rationales of the federal circuits and state
courts are poorly conceived from one another and virtually
impossible to reconcile.
From an academic perspective, the wide body of
inconsistent debt recharacterization decisions has made it
utterly impossible to determine if debt recharacterization
should be a power granted to state or federal courts. 136
Additionally, whether debt recharacterization should
independently exist at all warrants discussion. Further, the
lines between what triggers equitable subordination and debt
recharacterization are poorly defined. Some courts seem to use
each remedy interchangeably, whereas others treat each as a
The
distinct tool with different ends and means. 137
inconsistent application of debt recharacterization combined
with a multitude of approaches to the issue also fosters an
impetus to forum shop, contradicting the uniformity
envisioned by the Constitution. 138
Practically speaking, this doctrinal instability has created
a hostile environment for business decisions. Creditors are
132. Id.
133. Gelatt v. DeDakis, 254 N.W.2d 171, 186 (Wis. 1977).
134. Id. at 189.
135. Id.
136. Courts have applied four different standards for recharacterization in
federal courts alone. See Estes v. N & D Props., Inc. (In re N&D Props., Inc.), 799
F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1986); Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II LP (In re SubMicron
Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 455 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006); Fairchild Dornier GMBH v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors for Dornier Aviation of North America, Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir.
2006); Unsecured Creditors’ Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial
Funding Corp., Inc. (In re Pac. Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1986).
137. See Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934).
138. See supra Part I(A)(4).
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unwilling to extend potentially lifesaving loans for fear they
will be unable to recoup any of their expenses. 139 Venture
capital funds will be less likely to supply loans without
attaching exorbitant conditions in order to assure security of
their capital. 140 Acquisitions will be halted, while attorneys
choose to wash a company through bankruptcy before risking
the assumption of any questionable creditors, imposing
needless strain on an already overwhelmed judiciary.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Should Debt Recharacterization Exist At All?
The first question is whether or not debt
recharacterization even needs to continue existing as a
doctrine independent from equitable subordination. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court opinion in Albert Richards, for
example, used debt recharacterization as a remedy under state
law. 141 This very same case was cited by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Pepper v. Litton, a case that established federal power
to equitably subordinate claims. 142 Although the two courts
used different phraseology, they accomplished identical results
using near identical factors for analysis. 143 Despite the
confusion that inherently arises in reading both these cases, a
close look at the true purpose behind each doctrine clearly
indicates
that
equitable
subordination
and
debt
recharacterization provide independent remedies and can
coexist with one another to provide important contributions.
Firstly, as mentioned prior, 144 equitable subordination is a
doctrine that permits courts to void or subordinate the claims
of creditors upon a finding of inequitable conduct or a
combination of various other similar factors. 145 There is no
question that a loan had been extended, but the court considers
whether that loan should stand in light of other intervening
factors. Debt recharacterization, on the other hand, asks

139. See James H.M. Sprayregen, Recharacterization from Debt to Equity:
Lenders Beware, 22-NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30 (2003).
140. Id.
141. See Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934).
142. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
143. See id. at 311–12; Albert Richards Co., 191 N.E. at 434–35.
144. See supra Part I(B)(1).
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000).
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whether a bona fide loan was even made in the first place. 146 If
there were no loan ever transacted, then debt
recharacterization would classify that capital contribution as
equity. 147 Of course, creditor conduct may still factor into the
analysis, since such conduct can impact whether a loan is
formed (such as if improper procedures are followed). 148 While
the ends may be the same, the means to reach those ends differ
greatly between equitable subordination and debt
recharacterization. 149 As a result, both may serve valid legal
purposes while avoiding conflict with one another. Equitable
subordination serves to punish creditors that act inequitably,
while debt recharacterization corrects “sham” loans by
properly reclassifying as equity contributions. 150
B. Confusion and uncertainty among courts
Assuming, consistent with the above analysis, that debt
recharacterization should exist as an independent doctrine
from equitable subordination, the matter of courts’ differing
formulations of the doctrine still must be addressed. At
present, the Eleventh Circuit maintains an independent
analysis of the doctrine that differs from that of the Ninth
Circuit. 151 Each of those Circuits are in disagreement with the
Third, Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits, who have all agreed
on a common list of factors to be applied. 152 State courts have
also lent their voice to the issue by formulating independent
multi-factor tests in addition to those already established on
the federal level. Massachusetts, for example, has established
two key factors in its decisions. 153 Wisconsin, on the other
hand, administers debt recharacterization using a state
standard that diverges from both Massachusetts and the
federal tests. 154 The obvious consequence of this wide disparity
in recharacterization standards is that creditors face different
results depending on the state in which the corporation enters
146. See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Debt-to-Equity
Recharacterization Is It More Than Equitable Subordination’s Evil Twin?, 22NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (2004).
147. See, e.g., Diasonics Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990).
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See supra Part I(B)(2).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
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bankruptcy. With so many differing standards of debt
recharacterization, the development of any form of coherent
case law on the matter is stunted, weakening the legal
significance of what could otherwise be an important tool for
bankruptcy lawyers and judges.
C. The Present Debt Recharacterization Approach is
Inconsistent with Fundamental Bankruptcy Court
Principles
The current status of debt recharacterization also
contravenes a key principle of bankruptcy court function.
While these courts have traditionally been viewed as courts of
equity, 155 the ability to freely formulate equitable remedies is
illusory. 156 For example, power to equitably subordinate debt
is sourced from a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code, not
any inherent equitable power of the court. 157 While such
equitable powers were present nearly a century ago, 158 the
modern development of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that a
statutory basis is necessary for the exercise of such legal
authority. 159 Without a statutory basis for action, bankruptcy
courts are prevented from formulating remedies or developing
federal common law, 160 save several narrow exceptions. Debt
recharacterization does not fit within these narrowly drawn
instances. 161 Of course, this issue has up until the present been
ignored by federal cases that choose to recharacterize debt. 162
Nonetheless, specific codification of debt recharacterization
would reinforce fundamental bankruptcy principles while
solving the litany of other complications addressed in this
analysis.
D. The Current Approach Contravenes the Uniformity
155. See supra note 38.
156. See also, Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of A
Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not A Court of Equity, 79
AM. BANKR. L. J. 1, 2 (2005).
157. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000).
158. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
159. See generally JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 282 (4th ed. 1918).
160. See supra note 37; Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 B.R. 162
(N.D. Ill. 1990).
161. Id.
162. The Ninth Circuit is alone in refusing to recognize a federal ability to
recharacterize debt. See Unsecured Creditors’ Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v.
Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp., Inc., 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).
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Clause
The final important conflict the current debt
recharacterization analysis is incompatibility with the
uniformity required by the Bankruptcy Clause of the
Constitution. 163 That clause, which mandates that the rules
applied by all bankruptcy courts be uniform, 164 stands in clear
contrast with the current structure of debt recharacterization
law.
Firstly, individual federal circuits have established
differing views on the doctrine. 165 Not only do these analyses
use distinct factors, but some courts flat out refuse to recognize
the validity of debt recharacterization. 166 Such disparate
treatment is inconsistent with a fundamental purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code, which seeks to provide identical standards
for every bankruptcy court in the nation to the extent
possible. 167 Insolvency law and bankruptcy are not areas of law
in which federal common law development has been applied. 168
There is simply no basis for the differential treatment of debt
recharacterization on a federal level among the circuits where
the Bankruptcy Code is designed to provide as close to uniform
results as possible. 169
State law debt recharacterization processes 170 also
contravene the uniformity envisioned by the Constitution.
While state standards may not literally contradict existing
case law, it is axiomatic that a federal standard would
establish a more uniform standard among bankruptcy courts
than application of potentially fifty different state standards.

163. See supra Part I(A)(4).
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
165. The following cases, each in federal bankruptcy court, applied different
standards from one another. See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II LP (In re
SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 455 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006); Fairchild Dornier
GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors for Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225,
233 (4th Cir. 2006); In re Pacific Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding
Corp., 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).
166. See In re Pacific Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp., 69
B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).
167. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code itself stems in part from the
Constitutional mandate of bankruptcy uniformity. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
(empowering Congress to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States”).
168. See supra Part I(A)(2).
169. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 105.
170. See supra Part I(A)(5).
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Just because this degree of uniformity is not legally required
does not mean that it should be abandoned as unachievable.
Codification of debt recharacterization is a step in this exact
direction, and would help put bankruptcy courts on track in
the direction the Constitution envisioned.
E. Practical Impact on Corporate Law
The existing instability in the application of debt
recharacterization has an effect on the business environment
and corporate bankruptcy attorneys.
Lender hesitancy is especially concerning in business
environments like the Silicon Valley, where emerging
enterprises constantly shift between terms of profitability and
loss. Special “bridge loans” are often utilized to provide shortterm cash infusions to these companies to keep them on their
A debt
feet in periods of financial infancy. 171
recharacterization scheme that is impossible to navigate
means venture funds will be less willing to extend these bridge
loans, for fear that, should the enterprise go bankrupt, those
loans will be recharacterized and rendered virtually
unrecoverable.
With recharacterization codified and
accompanied by clear standards, investors are provided with
the increased predictability necessary to secure their loans
with other tools. 172 These lenders would be able to see from the
outset the probability of recharacterization arising, and have
the ability to compensate accordingly with other legal devices
to secure the integrity of their investments.
The corporate acquisitions market may also abate from
the uncertainty caused by inconsistent debt recharacterization
standards on both state and federal levels. While this does not
necessarily place the financial health of the acquiror at
immediate risk, it nonetheless presents a level of uncertainty
that can endanger relationships of the acquiror with the
target’s creditors. 173 A better strategy for the acquirer is
perhaps simply to let the target corporation enter into
bankruptcy and have the courts interpret the loans. Following
bankruptcy, the acquirer can emerge and assume control free

171. See David J. Kendall, Venture Capital Lending: Usury and Fiduciary
Duty Concerns, 33-APR COLO. LAW (2004).
172. Id.
173. See Yedidia Z. Stern, A General Model for Corporate Acquisition Law, 26
J. CORP. L. 675, 711–15 (2001).
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of potential infirmities of the target corporation’s debt. 174
F. Judicial Expense
Judicial resources are continuously wasted in dealing with
the current debt recharacterization regime. In the example
provided in the preceding paragraph, using the court system
as an arbiter for corporate decisions is a clear waste of
resources. Corporate attorneys will use the taxpayer as a tool
for private acquisitions due to the uncertainty resulting from
inconsistent recharacterization standards. Companies that
could be saved from bankruptcy and kept out of the courts may
be intentionally allowed to default so potential investors may
start with a clean slate and greater certainty regarding their
position with creditors.
Furthermore, the sheer number of differing standards
imposes unnecessary adjudicative complexity.
Courts
approaching a recharacterization analysis will be burdened
with having to balance federal versus state law on an issue.
Once that choice is made, the question remains regarding what
factors from each standard are relevant and should apply.
Recharacterization is a manner of interpreting loans in the
course of a bankruptcy, and need not be an area of law devoted
to complex choice of law analysis.
G. Recharacterization under State Law is Inadequate
A position among those who have considered the proper
remedy for the current debt recharacterization is that
recharacterization should exist only under state law. 175 The
basis for this proposal is stated in Travelers Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 176 There, the Court articulated
that it is a “settled principle [that] [c]reditors’ entitlements in
bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying
substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation, subject to any
qualifying or contrary provision of the Bankruptcy Code.”177
That case in question involved the Fobian rule. 178 The rule
174. See, e.g., David A. Warfield, Bankruptcy Bazaar: Purchasing Assets Out
of Bankruptcy Court, 51 J. MO. B. 283, 284–86 (1995).
175. See James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization
Under State Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257 (2007).
176. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
127 S. Ct. 1199, 1204–05 (2007).
177. Id. (quoting Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)).
178. Id. at 1203.
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asserted that where the litigated issue involves bankruptcy
issues, not basic contract issues, attorneys’ fees cannot be
collected absent a showing of certain circumstances. 179 That
common law rule was developed through bankruptcy court
decisions rather than the exercise of a particular statutory
provision. 180 The Court reasoned that since there was no
statutory support for the Fobian rule in Bankruptcy Code
Section 502(b) 181 (which is where the Code governs
disallowance of claims), the rule could not stand. 182 Thus, state
law was applied and Fobian rule struck down. 183
Proponents of a state-based recharacterization standard
also rely on a second case, Raleigh v. Illinois Department of
Revenue. 184 In that case, the Supreme Court considered
whether claims in bankruptcy should be considered based on
federal rules or a state specific standard. 185 The federal rules,
while uniform, were not codified into the Bankruptcy Code. 186
The Court again focused on the uneven results from applying
a mix of federal or state law. 187 Specifically, the Court noted
that it could not have been Congress’s intent that state and
federal courts produce rules that could lead to such conflicting
results. 188 Critical in the Court’s reasoning in both Raleigh and
Traveler’s Casualty Insurance is the rule that in the absence of
a modification to the Bankruptcy Code, claims are determined
through state law. 189 This sentiment has been echoed in other
rulings as well. 190
The above reasoning forms the backbone of the argument
for debt recharacterization under a state standard. The
proponents indicate the explicit standard for equitable
subordination in the Bankruptcy Code as noted by the Court

179. Id. at 1203.
180. Id. at 1207.
181. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(b).
182. Travelers Casualty, 127 S. Ct. at 1207.
183. Id.
184. Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
185. Id. at 20.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 25–26.
188. Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 25–26 (2000).
189. Id. at 20.
190. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 57, 54 (1979)); see also Vanston
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946) (“What claims
of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt at the time
a petition in bankruptcy is filed, is a question which, in the absence of overruling
federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law.”).
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in its decisions on the matter. 191 This is considered proof that
the equitable powers of the court must still be grounded within
the Code in order to be effectuated. 192 Thus, recharacterization
as an “equitable” remedy produced by a federal court simply is
not sufficient. Proponents of a state law standard argue that
debt recharacterization is a form of contract interpretation and
should be governed by state law in the absence of federal
standards. 193 Currently of course, the Bankruptcy Code does
Thus, absent any
not address recharacterization. 194
Congressional action to the contrary, Supreme Court
precedent seems to dictate that debt recharacterization fall
under state law. 195
State law proponents also argue that in addition to being
consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, state law debt
recharacterization provides the doctrinal stability so keenly
needed. 196 These proponents also indicate, as this comment
does, that this stability will brighten the business climate for
creditors, business insiders, and even third party investors. 197
In support of this proposition, the laws of Wisconsin and
Massachusetts are put forth as examples of functioning state
recharacterization standards. 198
In citing each of these state standards for support,
however, advocates for the state standard reveal the precise
reason such a standard fails to help the recharacterization
doctrine rescue itself from the current confusion. 199 State
courts will develop potentially fifty different methods of
recharacterizing debt. Creditors will be subject to fifty
different outcomes, and forum shopping will increase as these
creditors seek favorable state law (for example through the use
of forum selection clauses in loan instruments). 200 While this
191. Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 24 (2000).
192. Id. at 24–25.
193. HSBC Bank USA v. Branch (In re Bank of New England Corp.), 364 F.3d
355, 363 (1st Cir. 2004).
194. See Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001).
195. See James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization
Under State Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257, 1278 (2007).
196. Id. at 1278–79.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (where the
Court held forum selection clauses in federal courts presumptively valid and
enforceable); In re Millennium Studios, Inc., 286 B.R. 300, 306 (D. Md.
2002) (“strong showing” of exceptional facts required to void forum selection
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result still would seem to fit within the “uniformity” as
technically permitted by the Court, 201 it certainly contravenes
the uniformity envisioned by Article I and the creation of
federal bankruptcy courts intended to provide a uniform
nationwide bankruptcy system. 202
Finally, state law proponents criticize existing federal
court decisions applying federal standards for debt
recharacterization. 203 Specifically, the Roth Steel factors 204 are
targeted as being too vague to provide any degree of useful
predictability. 205 These factors however, must necessarily
possess some degree of inchoateness so bankruptcy courts have
the ability to fashion case-specific remedies in the discharge of
their “equitable” duties. 206 While the court’s equitable power
is granted in the modern era by statute, bankruptcy courts are
expected to weigh the merits of each individual case they
adjudicate. 207 Assuming that a bankruptcy court can indeed
recharacterize debt, the Roth Steel factors are capable tools for
giving a court the space to fashion appropriate case specific
remedies while still providing the necessary foresight for
attorneys to fashion effective loan agreements.
IV.
TOWARDS CODIFICATION OF DEBT
RECHARACTERIZATION IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Debt recharacterization deserves to exist as an
independent doctrine from equitable subordination. As stated
previously, equitable subordination is a remedy in which a
clauses in the context of bankruptcy venue).
201. See Judith S. Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22
(1983).
202. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (mandating that Congress make uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies); see also Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional
Limitations on State-Enacted Bankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long
Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 354 (2014).
203. See James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization
Under State Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257, 1277 (2007).
204. See supra note 93.
205. See supra note 93.
206. The original Courts of Equity were established with flexibility as a
fundamental characteristic, so as to adjudicate cases where injustice would result
from the rigid application of common law. See supra note 44.
207. See, e.g., Aerospace & Elec. Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 229 B.R. 860,
871 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (“Section 105(a)’s broad statutory directive that
bankruptcy courts shall have the power to issue any order necessary to effectuate
a Chapter 11 plan is consistent with the general understanding that these
tribunals are courts of equity.”).
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creditor loan is subordinated based on some inequitable
conduct by the creditor. 208 Debt recharacterization, which
looks to whether a loan was even made in the first place, 209
provides a unique and important tool for analysis that should
be utilized by bankruptcy courts. Simply choosing to not
recognize the doctrine of recharacterization is as equally
unacceptable as the present doctrinal chaos.
Thus, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to
include debt recharacterization as an express provision within.
A clear, universal standard is needed to sufficiently address
the inconsistency currently plaguing the doctrine. For the
reasons mentioned above, a state law standard is
insufficient. 210 Further, the matter cannot be simply left to the
courts to develop through case law, as bankruptcy courts are
limited to only a few explicitly enumerated areas in which to
develop federal common law. 211
A distinct section of the Code setting forth the
circumstances for use and factors to be applied in a
recharacterization analysis facilitates the greatest degree of
legal clarity and practical utility. Such a section should look
very much like the existing Code section that sets forth the
power of a court to equitably subordinate loans. 212 More
specifically, codification of the Roth Steel factors 213 into the
section is appropriate, which the majority of federal circuits
already apply. 214 This enumeration of specific factors is of
paramount importance.
Creditors can structure their
financings appropriately, having a greater degree of foresight
as to the potential risk of their debt interests should
bankruptcy result. The fact that no single factor controls the
analysis, however, also preserves the flexibility of the courts to
provide individualized remedies in each proceeding.

208. See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Debt-to-Equity
Recharacterization Is It More Than Equitable Subordination’s Evil Twin, 22-NOV
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (2004).
209. Id.
210. See supra Part III(G).
211. See supra Part I(A)(2).
212. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000).
213. See supra note 93.
214. See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II LP, 432 F.3d 448, 455 n.8 (3d Cir.
2006); Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured, 453 F.3d 225,
233 (4th Cir. 2006); Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 747–53 (6th
Cir. 2001); Sender v. The Bronze Group, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir.
2004).
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The most readily apparent benefit to the codification of
debt recharacterization is the resulting doctrinal clarity.
Specific factors enumerated in the Bankruptcy Code mean
courts can look to a single source of law with explicit means for
analysis. Since the Bankruptcy Code is federal law, it would
preempt state law when exercised by the bankruptcy court
Ideally,
undertaking the recharacterization analysis. 215
preemptive intent should also be explicitly stated in the statute
or legislative history of the codified version of
recharacterization for maximal clarity. The federal standard’s
uniformity, while not strictly required by current
constitutional jurisprudence, 216 is nonetheless a benefit to
incorporating debt recharacterization into the Code. Under
the proposed approach, creditors would have no incentive to
forum shop among courts with differing outlooks towards
recharacterization.
Perhaps the only drawback to the creation of a federal
standard is a federalism-based argument that addition of debt
recharacterization to the Code takes away what should be a
domain for state law, which of course normally governs the
relationships between debtor and creditor.
Debt
recharacterization, a tool of loan interpretation, could thus be
said to properly reside in state law as a tool purposed for
defining creditor relationships. However, recharacterization is
a remedy most commonly sought where entities enter into
bankruptcy. 217 Its inclusion in the Bankruptcy Code, a body of
law used exclusively by federal courts, 218 is equally
appropriate. Federal law, which provides the power to
adjudicate bankruptcies through Article I of the
Constitution, 219 is the proper place for a bankruptcy-centric
215. For more on the Federal preemption of state law, see generally Caleb
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000).
216. See generally Judith S. Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption
Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 22 (1983).
217. Every case in which the doctrine of debt recharacterization has arisen is
in the context of a bankruptcy. See, e.g., Estes v. N & D Props., Inc., 799 F.2d 726
(11th Cir. 1986); Diasonics Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990);
Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir.
1986).
218. Federal courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. See
generally, Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A
General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 746
(2000).
219. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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doctrine like debt recharacterization. Nonetheless, should
individual states desire to enact debt recharacterization-like
provisions for use outside of the bankruptcy context, there is
nothing stopping them from doing so. Recharacterization’s use
in the bankruptcy context, however, should be reserved for
bankruptcy courts under the Code.
CONCLUSION
The current approach to debt recharacterization is
confusing in theory and unworkable in application. Simply
eliminating the doctrine of debt recharacterization, however,
is an abrogation of a valuable judicial tool, one that serves an
important purpose independent from equitable subordination.
While some have called for recharacterization to
incorporate as a select state law element of bankruptcy law,
that proposal solves but a fraction of the issues plaguing the
current system.
Rather, a congressional mandate to
incorporate recharacterization as a section of the Bankruptcy
Code provides the best solution to establish both a uniform and
useful debt recharacterization system.
Codification brings theoretical clarity and practical utility
to the legal community. Corporate attorneys will enjoy the
certainty of a uniform federal standard applying enumerated
factors.
Business transactions can be more confidently
pursued, with everything from acquisitions to bridge loans
being expedited because of this transparent standard. Finally,
bankruptcy courts are spared the murky wade through
multiple independent recharacterization approaches. A single
body of federal recharacterization law can be developed,
promoting judicial precision and efficiency.

